Abstract-With the sharp increase in the number of smartphones, the Android platform pose to becoming a market leader that makes the need for malware analysis on this platform an urgent issue. The current Artificial Immune-Based malware detection systems research focus on traditional computers that uses information from OS or network, but the smartphone software behavior has its own structure and semantics. Current research cannot detect malware in smartphone exactly and efficiently. To address these problems, in this paper, we capitalize on earlier approaches for dynamic analysis of application behavior as a means for detecting malware in the smartphone. An Artificial Immune-Based Smartphone Malware Detection Framework is brought forwards and a prototype system is implemented, the experiment result show that the system can obtain higher detection rate and decrease the false positive rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Malware detection based on software running behavior and its status, and found that the acts of sabotage and attempts on the system. Current malware detection is mainly concentrated in the traditional desktop computer, made a lot of research, but relatively small for the new smartphone malware detection. Traditional malware detection system for the analysis of the detection information from the log of the system is running.
New type of smartphone system running log obtain the more difficult compared to desktop-class operating system and network logs, it has more complex structure, usually has a unique semantics. Data mining, neural networks, machine learning technology based desktopclass operating system-level malware detection model is usually not taken into account the characteristics of the smartphone, there are some disadvantages of the smartphone operating system malware detection. The biological immune system has a good diversity, tolerance, and immune memory, distributed parallel processing, self-organizing, and self-learning. Adaptive and robustness, with the immune principle to build smartphone malware detection model can significantly improve the detection efficiency of the malware detection system of the smartphone.
A smartphone malware detection technology based on artificial immune framework is proposed in this paper. Classic artificial immune model based on the concept of the gene and to describe the combination of objects of the type of operation and operating software behavior; conditional maximum does not repeat principles used to extract the antigen and the use of unequal length unequal length string matching rules used for affinity calculation. The test experiments show that the malicious software detection system implement on the Android platform based on this model can effectively detect popular malware and its variants.
Article is organized as follows: Section 2 of the research work for the introduction and evaluation; Section 3 of the problem to formally describe and briefly introduced the use of conditional maximize does not repeat principle and not equal string matching principle; section 4 give a detailed description of the smartphone malware detection framework, the composition and the use of key technologies; Section 5 verified by experiments the effectiveness of the model; Finally, summarize, and introduced the next research ideas.
II. RELATED WORK
In 1974, Jerne [1] proposed a mathematical model of the immune system, laid the basis for the calculation of the immune. In 1994, Forrest [2] proposed negative selection algorithm, and using the algorithm simulates some basic concepts of computer immune system tolerance to process autologous. In 2000, Forrest et al. [3] established the architecture of the artificial immune system based on a network malware detection prototype system named Lisys.
Due to the complexity of the structure of the smartphone, smartphone malware detection technologies face more difficulty. Guo et al. [4] examined various types of attacks that can be launched to a compromised smartphone, and suggested potential defenses. Mulliner et al. [5] demonstrated a proof-of-concept malware which crosses service boundaries in Windows CE phones. They also revealed buffer overflow vulnerabilities in MMS [6] .
Christorescu and Somesh et al. [6] proposed a new semantic-aware static malware detection technique, and try to identify the same semantics of different programs to detect the scrambling code, they decompiled the code to generate behavior predefined template and store them to match malware, then, it can be used to detect simple scrambled malware, its shortcomings is that it needs to precisely match a predefined template, limited the number of malware that can be detected.
Zhu and Cao et al. [7] made use of social network to detect the cellular network worm. Smartphones through the network traffic between the social relations between the terminal drawn maps, smartphone user usually open and download content from their reliable friends; the social network worms diagram describes the most like-ly transmission mode of network worms. The Authors of the paper proposed two segmentation algorithms graph of social relations: balance segmentation and cluster-ing segmentation. Social network approach can solve the mobile network worm propagation detection proble-m, but the method can't be used to detect other types of smartphone malware.
Abhijit and Hu et al. [8, 13] proposed a framework mobile for worms, viruses and Trojan horse detecti-on. They first present a time domain sequence based on the logical order of program behavior, and then they give an effective representation of malware behaviors. Each one of these behaviors may not be threatened if a single look. The authors validated the framework in Symbian OS. They stored 25 kinds of typical behavior of malicious software coding sequence into the database, and then proposed a two-stage mapping technology with the knowledge of the run-time system monitoring events and procedures based API. They use support vector machine classifier to distinguish between malware and normal software.
Shabtai et al. presented in [22, 23] a methodology to detect suspicious temporal patterns as malicious behavior, known as knowledge-based temporal abstraction. Both works use knowledge-based analysis while our system is behavior based. These can be complementary techniques. Even though, their approach is recommended for detecting continuous attacks (e.g., DoS, worm infection). [15, 17, 18, 19] . Their system used dynamic analysis techniques to monitor sensitive information on Android. Thus, they can track a suspicious third-party application that uses sensitive data as GPS location information or address book information. The shortcoming of their method is that an application using sensitive data does not necessarily correspond to malware, many normal applications may be considered as malware.
Enck et al. presented TaintDroid in
Burguera and Zurutuza et al. [24] give a framework to detect malware on Android platform. They monitoring system call in Linux level and generate software behavioral patterns and classify these patterns by using cluster algorithm. Their method is efficient in detecting malware that behavior can be seen from Linux kernel, but behavior of many kinds of malware cannot been seen from Linux level, such as send malicious SMS malware, malicious call malware etc.
Due to the lack of smartphone malware patterns by now, most of anomaly detection techniques used the battery power consumption as the main malware detection system feature [26] . These techniques were based on checking and monitoring mobile phones power consumption and comparing them with the normal power consumption pattern to detect anomalies. These techniques are specifically designed to detect attacks targeting battery lifes.
Resource limitations of smartphones have lead researchers to propose collaborative analysis techniques, where the analysis is made by a network of devices. Both static and dynamic analysis [23, 24] have been proposed using these techniques.
None of the above approaches can used to detect unknown malware and since the multi-layer architecture of smartphone operating system is significantly different from those of other environments [9, 10, 11] , there is a need for creating a new runtime detection model that is suitable for smartphone both in terms of expressive power and computational feasibility.
III. PRELIMINARIES

A. Formal Descriptions
Before carrying out further research on the smartphone malware detection based on artificial immune, the formal description, clear concepts and definitions are gave as follows.
Definition 1: Process Session (abbreviated as PS). After pretreatment of a smartphone process running procedure is defined as a process session, which contains the main information of access sequence of system API at a specific time period.
Definition 2: self and nonself. According to the concept of process session, self defined as the normal process session, nonself defined as abnormal process session. Software usually uses the system API to access OS providing functions. The short sequence of system API access is used to determine the process session is self or nonself. Use self that belongs to a collection of short sequences of autologous, nonself is a non-collection from the body of the short sequence.
Definition 3: Gene Pool (abbreviated as GP). Define the type of operation (abbreviated as OP) and manipulate objects (abbreviated as OO) combination {OP OO} gene, and in accordance with the OP changes in the smartphone is divided into "read operations (Read critical resource)", "write operation (Create, Update critical resource), the use of read, write, denoted by R and W.
Definition 4: antigen and antibody (abbreviated as Ag & Ab). Genetic composition of the antigen and antibody by the gene pool are defined as antigen and antibody. A process session is classified into {OO1, OP1, OO2, OP2,..., OOn, OPn} of the sequence for the antigen, if the sequence is present in the detector is known as antibody. Use a collection of Ag expressed antigen: Ag = {ag | ag = (ag1, ag2,..., agn)} n-th gene, which agn said antigen, the use of a collection of Ab said antibody: Ab = {ab | ab = (ab1, ab2,..., abn)}, which the abn said antibody of the nth gene.
Definition 5: Detector. The main components of the detector are antibodies; in addition to said detector state of various parameters, such as age, life has to match the number and maturity. We can use the following formula: (1)
Where type represents the type of detector, 1 for immature detector (abbreviated as IMD), 2 for mature detector (abbreviated as MaD), 3 for memory detector (abbreviated as MED), 4 for pending detector in the detection phase (abbreviated as PeD), it is a special kind of immature detectors; ab said antibody, namely the operation of short sequences; life represents the life of the detector, the different types of detectors have different life; count is used to define the match number of short sequences occur in the detector antibody collection; N is the set of natural numbers. The introductions of dot symbols are used to visit the various components of the antibody, such as d.count antigen match the number that represents the detector. Detector satisfies the following relationship:
The dashed box in Figure 1 said the similarity of the two detectors, the division of two phases only for immature detectors and pending detector has nothing to do with the content outside the dashed box. 
B. Conditional Maximum does not Repeat Principle
According to the definition given above, the smartphone malware detection based on artificial immune described as follows: under conditions of limited resources, the malware detection model detects any element in the collected process session set U of the smartphone, classify them into normal process session set NS or abnormal session set AS. False positive and false negative are two error types, the detection rate, false positives and false negative rate are used to assess the efficacy of the model in the detection process.
Maximum does not repeat principle refers to the existence of an orderly repeat string S, and all the characters belong to S, contains the character table of the limited character of the sigma. Interception sub-string Sub in turn from the first element of S, the requirements of Sub is that the Sub is the longest one that not contains repeat characters and the length of it is not 1. However, this division of the string method may lead to a long string of up to repeat the string into its own. If a smartphone process session not repeated operations on the system API, the same problem will appear. Some constraints needed to be added up to the principle of: limited to allow the longest substring of K, split strings that their length K equals or larger than K, even if all the characters in the string are not the same be divided by principle. This limit avoid detector antibody unlimited growing.
The process of using conditional maximum does not repeat principle to divide string is shown in Figure 2 
C. Not equal String Matching Principle
There are two unequal length strings x and y, if the length of the shorter string is greater than half the length of the longer string, and the shorter string is a substring of the longer string, we think the two strings match, the match rule is defined not equal string matching principle. The formal description is as follow:
According to the software behavior audit log, the lengths of most antigens are unequal; the use of ab and ag exactly equal matching method will produce a large number of redundant detector. In this model, the ab and ag genes from the GP, the GP is a quantitative character collection, not equal string matching rules are used to match ab and ag. The following formula is used to represent the principle:
IsSubstr x y IsSubstr y x f x y otherwise
∨  =  (4)
D. Match Processing
Match ag and ab comply with the following relationship:
The function f (ab, ag) length string matching rules to determine the match between ab and ag, the definition of ag ab substring match positive match (the Positive the Match, abbreviated as PM), define ab is agsubstring match to negative match (Negative match, abbreviated as NM). ag and ab match occurs when processing algorithms as follows: 
IV. FRAMEWORK COMPOSITION AND KEY TECHNOLOGIES
The detection framework include five main modules, they are log preprocessing module, the module of the gene pool, immature (pending) detector module tolerance, mature detector module and memory detector detection module. The model introduces the mechanism of the life cycle of the detector, can effectively control the size and model of the detector with good dynamic characteristics. The Model is shown in Figure 3 . The square in Figure 3 , said processes and the dotted line ovals said temporary data collections, the solid line ovals said data collections, empty arrows indicate the flow of control, and black arrows indicate data flow.
Detection model include the training and detecting phases. The training phase of the mission provide mature detector set for anomaly detection, the detection phase, according to the model in advance to learn the knowledge gained to implement malware detection task. Each stage is divided into two steps, and malware detection stage, for example: First, the system API audit log preprocessing, smartphone process session collections can be obtained, this process is the basis of the follow-up operation; and then the anomaly detection, the use of the training phase detector set to detect abnormal behaviors based on user operation sequences.
The core of the anomaly detection is management of update, tolerance and death of the three types of detector antibody. The procedure is shown in Figure 4 . The model consists of two processes: one is the antigen processing process; the other is detector antibody evolution process. Costimulatory in the Figure is get an affirmative answer information from user or system manager, the negative response or no response within a certain period of time known as the costimulate fail. 
E. Antigen Processing
Behavior sequence set (referred to as BSS) can be obtained after log preprocessing, system API access sequence set (referred to as SAASS) also can be obtained. Gene short series can be obtained from the above sets a based on the maximum does not repeat principle, namely antigen. G (x) is used to decide whether x is a element of GP, its definition is shown as follow.
The antigen-processing algorithm is shown in the following part. wait co-stimulate signal; } 8. if (costimulate success) Delete (ag); 9. if ! (G (ag) match matured_ab) Construct PeD; }
F. Antibody evolution process
Immature and mature antibodies generated in the training phase of the collection are the basis and premise of the framework runs, there are three different types of antibody evolution process:
Antibody memory: When the memory antibody matches the antigen, the system determines that there is a malware alert waiting for system manager to confirm. Costimulatory successful memory antibody to retain and increase its affinity or memory antibody deaths;
Immature antibody: Affirmative selection algorithm is used in the detection framework and immature detectors are the key to the discovery of malware. The immature antibody evolution, there are two flows to: First, the lifetime did not match enough antibodies cannot be activated, too old to be deleted; in the life cycle is successfully activated, enter the co-stimulatory process, if costimulatory successfully converted to memory antibody, to maintain the characteristics of malicious behavior, or converted to the mature antibody, to maintain the characteristics of legitimate behavior.
Mature antibody: mature antibody is credible autologous collection, retention and maintenance of the collection is to maintain a modest scale of the collection of autologous antigen match the new immature antibodies. Mature antibody will be deleted because there is no match in the life cycle of a sufficient number of antigens.
In order to ensure the diversity of the antibody, to avoid too little immature antibodies and mature antibody cannot detect non-self antigens, while the need to restrict the size of the antibody of the framework, the total number of antibodies if limited as a constant, mature antibody will be Scheduled scanning, and some of the poor quality of the antibody will be deleted.
G. Gene Pool Management
In this model, Management module of the GP is different from the traditional artificial immune immunity. In actual situation, the operation of smartphone applications access the system API are often unavailable, so only collected software behavior log contains information extraction type of operation and manipulate objects. Therefore, the GP of the model is incremental, so when the model runs in reliable smartphone, once the discovery of new genes can be perceived abnormal behavior. The workflow of GP management module is shown in Figure  5 . AS the detection framework use affirmative selection algorithm, the antibodies may be immature detector matches the self antigen or non-self antigen, test results need further judgment. While immature detector matches the number of matching threshold τ, the detector will be activated and give an alarm signal, waiting for the judgment of the security administrator, if the costimulatory, immature detector will convert the memory detector for rapid detection of malware otherwise, immature detector is converted to the mature detector, become a relatively stable collection of autologous. In order to limit the size of detector set, and also the immature detector, if the detector within the prescribed time does not match a sufficient number of antigen, the detector will be deleted. Immature detector module performs the detection process shown in Figure 6 .
I. B-cell processes and changes
To both counteract the increase in population size brought about by reproduction and keep the malware detection framework dynamic, cell death processes must be implemented [25] . A naïve B-cell has not proved itself useful to the framework and as such is given a finite lifespan when created, although it may lengthen its life by continually recognizing new type of smartphone malware. Memory B-cells may also die, but these cells have proved their worth and it can be hard for the framework to generate clones capable of performing well. For this reason, unlike naïve B-cells, memory cells are purged in a data driven manner. When a new memory cell mc, is added to the memory cell set all memory cells recognizing mc have a stimulation counter reduced. When this count reaches zero they are purged from the framework. This dissuades the algorithm from producing an overabundance of memory cells over roughly the same area when a single cell is quite sufficient.
During the run of the detection framework, there are many more naïve B-cells compared with memory cells. The number of cells in the naïve B-cell population, after an initial rapid growth period, appears fairly stable. There is an increase over the duration of the testing, but this is small relative to the size of the population. All changes appear steady but it is impossible to tell if the slight increase in numbers is due to the nature of the data rather than an underlying problem with the framework. On the basis of these results we are content that the process of naïve cell death after a given number of user signals is an effective control mechanism. Similarly, the memory Bcell population size is too acting broadly as hoped. There is no rapid change in the size of this cell set, as would be the case if many of its elements were subject to deletion at once. This would be evidence that the framework had failed in the placing of many memory cells. The memory cell population size is increasing over time, but at a decreasing rate. From this evidence it is impossible to tell if the framework will reach a state where the creation of new memory cells is exactly balanced by cell death, but as the population size appears to be leveling off as the number of classification attempts increases, we are again satisfied that this strategy is working as expected.
To purge the framework of cells which may detect new smartphone malware, it uses the two signal approach. We may assume that signal one has occurred, that is the antigen generated from the classified smartphone software has already stimulated a B-cell to have been classified. Signal two comes from the user in the form of interpreting the user's reaction to this software. It is during this stage that useful cells are stimulated and unstimulated cells are removed from the framework. Let BC represents an initially empty set of naïve B-cells, bc represents a element of BC, MC represents an initially empty set of memory B-cell, mc represents a element of MC, ka represents the affinity threshold. The B-cell population update algorithm is presented as follows. bc_sti_count++; 5.
bc_best←element of BC with highest affinity to ag; 6.
BC←BC∪clone_mutate (bc_best.ag); 7.
bc_best←element of BC with highest affinity to ag; 8.
mc_best←element of MC with highest affinity to ag; 9.
if (affinity (bc_best, ag)> affinity (mc_best, ag)) { 10.
BC←BC\bc_best}; 11.
bc_best_sti_count←ksm; 12.
MC←MC∪{bc_best}; 13.
foreach (mc∈MC) 14.
if (affinity (bc_best, mc) > ka) mc_sti_count--; } 15.
add behavior sequence from AG to GP; } 16. else { 17.
foreach (bc∈ (MC∪BC)) { 18.
if (affinity (bc, ag) > ka) { 19.
remove all behavior sequences in BC from GP; 20.
delete bc from framework; }} 21.
foreach (bc∈BC) bc_sti_count--; 22.
foreach (bc∈ (MC∪BC)) { 23.
if (bc_sti_count = 0) delete bc from framework; } 24. }}
V. EVALUATION
A. Malware Detection Evaluation
A malware detection system is implemented in Android platform based on the above detection framework. We use False Positive rate and False Negative rate to measure the accuracy of malware detection. The False Positive Rate (say FPR in short) and False Negative Rate (say FNR in short) is defined as follows:
As a test system, we have taken the Android Froyo that kernel version is 2.6.25 operating on the htc hero handset. As Android market is most famous Android software sharing place, we choose the most popular 100 software in Android market as our normal software test swatches, choose three typical popular malware as our malicious software test swatches. Google Inc. announces that much famous and popular software has been infected by these three types of malware. We put the 100 normal software and selected 2 of each type of malware to characteristic learning module to taint the detect engine, then another 200 software are sent to detect engine to test the effective of the detect model. The test result is displayed in Table 1 . Table I shows the result when applying the detection system to different famous malware. The framework is built for each type of malware. We can see that the detection system can detect most of these three types of malware, and the false positive rate and false negative rate are small, because the behavior of these three type of malware are very distinct. Table I shows the result when applying the detection framework to different famous malware. We can see that the framework can detect most of these three types of malware, and the false positive rate and false negative rate are small, because the behavior of these three type of malware are very distinct.
A. B. Performance Evaluation
The primary users of smartphones in general and Android in particular are usually unable or unwilling to sacrifice performance for security. Moreover, the computational power of most smartphones, while being superior to traditional cell phones, is still lower than desktop computers. It is therefore necessary that the security policy model not overly tax the computational capabilities of the phone.
Message service, location service and shell script are three import executable program while using Android smartphones. These three programs can also candidate our three types protected object. Figure 7 shows the spending time that with and without the malware detection system. The result shows that the performance decrease is bearable. The result shows that after add malware detection system in virginal Android system, the decrease of running efficiency of three typical applications are endurable, and the largest decrease is not pass 18%.
B. C. Power Consumption Evaluation
Measurement of battery consumption on Android is difficult due to the fact that the battery charge level reported by the Android hardware is at a very coarse grained level. Using software for measurement of battery consumption during playing 3-dimension game for about 5 minutes simply yields 'no charge' in battery level. However, note that since we use hash table to store normal and abnormal software behavior signature information, the decision-making time consumption is linear.
Therefore, using the same arguments as those for time consumption, we can conclude that the battery consumption overhead caused by our decision making mechanism is also bearable.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Near all of the market indicators foresee that there will be a massive increase in the number of smartphones purchased in the next 5 or even 10 years. This will create a potential for a massive increase in malware generation, and in particular in the sector dominated by the market leader, potentially the Android platform.
In this paper we have proposed a new framework to obtain and analyze smartphone application activity in Android framework. In collaboration with the Android user community, it will be capable of distinguishing between benign and malicious applications of the same name and version, detecting anomalous behavior of known applications. We have indicated that monitoring software behavioral activity in Android framework is a feasible way for detecting malware. According to the brief survey in section 2, we have seen that there're many different approaches to detect malware in traditional PC and malware in smartphone, such as Microsoft Windows Mobile, Nokia Symbian, Apple ios and Google Android. We considered that monitoring software behavioral activity in Android framework is one of the most accurate techniques to determine the behavior of Android applications, since they provide detailed and effected low level information. We do realize that framework level Android SDK function call monitoring techniques can contribute to a deeper analysis of the malware, providing more useful information about malware behavior and more accurate results. On the other hand, more monitoring capability will place a higher demand on the amount of resources consumed in the device.
We have seen that SendTextMessage (), SendMultipartTextMessage (), getPhoneService (), and getCurrentLocation () are the most used SDK functions by malware. A benign application could make moderate or heavy use of those function calls and thus trigger false positives, but authors trust that slight differences would make the system classify Trojans correctly. We have seen that trojanized applications made more these kinds of SDK function call executions.
The most important contribution of this work is the mechanism we propose for obtaining real traces of application behavior in Android framework. We have seen in previous works that it is possible to obtain behavior information using artificially created user actions, or creating replicas of smartphones, but our detection framework helps the community to obtain real application traces of hundreds or even thousands of applications.
Next step, we will implement our detection framework in as many different versions of smartphones as possible. Smartphones running our customized android operating system that embedded the above detection framework will have the opportunity to see their own smartphone behavior. We could even alert the users when one of their applications shows an abnormal trace. The system can also act as an early warning system, being capable of detecting malicious or abnormally behaving applications in early stages of propagation. By implementing other tools that run in more powerful PC or server, we have demonstrated that one can obtain behavior-based information and get it processed on a central server.
We have chosen an artificial immunology algorithm to distinguish between benign applications and their correspondent malware version. The results have been encouraging, although we need to address some open issues. First, the system would always separate the software process sessions in two sets even if there is no malware on it. The software process session mapping would change drastically whenever a malicious process session enters into the normal dataset. These issues require some manual check or further automatic analysis. Second, one could intentionally submit incorrect data to the system leaving the dataset corrupt. One next step is to authenticate the submitting application so we can ensure that nobody is directly sending wrong data to the system. Regarding the communication mechanism between the detection system running in smartphones and our data processing server, it is made using the public TCP/IP protocol in current version, without focusing on protecting the privacy of transferred data. If an attacker sniffs and manipulates the traffic in the communication process, it can lead to misclassification errors. In order to avoid this, we will introduce encryption mechanisms to provide integrity of data and authenticity of the sender. We have to take into account that applying this technique in the mobile device, it might have an extra overhead in the processor, resulting in a fast battery drain.
This work is simply the first step in a longer journey towards realizing practical smartphone malware detection system.
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